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the lien before that time is general in nature and not specifically bind-
ing upon any particular property.19
In conclusion: a writ of execution delivered to the proper official
and properly endorsed by him (1) creates a lien upon the property of
the debtor against whom the execution was issued (2) protects the
creditor through priority of lien against subsequent writs of execution,
except the subsequent execution which is first levied (3) protects the
creditor against bona fide purchasers of real property only after the
creditor has filed a lis pendens notice.
NonmA D. BosTm
CECIL V. FARMERS NATIONAL BANK-TERMINATION OF
LIMITED DIVORCES
In Cecil v. Farmers National Bank' the Kentucky Court of Appeals
had before it a very novel and interesting question. The suit was
brought by an alleged widow to establish a right of dower. She had
married the deceased in 1941, but had obtained a divorce from bed
and board from him in 1943. A property settlement by which the
plaintiff accepted $2,000 from her husband "in full settlement of her
distributive right in his estate" was incorporated into the separation
decree. Six months later the parties became reconciled, moved to
another town and lived together as man and wife until his death in
1949. Neither of the parties ever petitioned for an annulment or modi-
fication of the separation decree. The question before the court was:
did the reconciliation of the parties, who thereafter lived together as
man and wife and so held themselves out to the general public be-
lieving that it was unnecessary to remarry, annul the separation decree
and set aside their agreement wherein she relinquished her dower in
his estate? The court held that it did not. However, they further
stated, "this does not mean they could not mutually rescind their
property settlement incorporated in the divorce judgment." Thus, the
court sent the case back to determine the question of rescission.
The court was undoubtedly sound in holding that the parties
could not by mere reconciliation and subsequently living together as
man and wife abrogate the decree of limited divorce. The Kentucky
Statutes permit the granting of a divorce from bed and board for any
' C.T.C. Investment Co. v. Daniel Boone Coal Corporation, 58 F. 2d 305
(E.D. Ky. 1931).
1245 S.W. 2d 430 (Ky. 1952).
Nom AND COMMENTS
cause that the court in its discretion considers sufficient.2 They also
make provision regarding the legal effect of such divorces on sub-
sequently acquired property.3 Further and most important, they pro-
vide that the judgment "may be revised or set aside at anytime by the
court rendering it."4 The Kentucky Civil Code of Practice also has a
section governing the procedure for setting aside such divorces.5 In
the light of these statutes and code provisions the Court said:
"These statutes provide upon what grounds a divorce
from bed and board may be obtained, how it differs from an absolute
divorce and the procedure to be followed in annuling the judgment
in each form of action. In this jurisdiction marriage and divorce are
purely statutory and common law marriage is not recognized. The
statutes just referred to are conclusive on the question of annuling the
divorce."'
While the Kentucky Court in its opinion recognized several foreign
decisions holding that a divorce from bed and board is not a final
proceeding and that a reconciliation may put an end to the judgment,7
it felt that the interest of the public and the state in marital and
domestic relations is of sufficient importance to warrant the necessity
of a court order as a prerequisite to any legal change in such a rela-
tion. As the court said:
"... the state is concerned with marriage and divorce,
whether it be an absolute divorce or a divorce from bed and board,
and the Legislature having provided how the judgment in each
character of divorce may be annulled, the couple desiring an annul-
ment must pursue the course prescribed in the statutes."8
Assuming that the court in holding that the parties could "mu-
tually rescind" their property settlement were referring to a rescission
by mere mutual expressions of consent, the soundness of the holding
may very well be questioned. By the property settlement the wife had
"accepted $2,000 from Charles in full settlement of her distributive
right in his estate." It may well be asked: Could such an agreement
be rescinded?
That the widow's right of dower is an individual interest which
vests at the time of the marriage or as to subsequently acquired prop-
'Ky. REv. STAT. 403.050 (1948).
a Ibid.
4 Ibid.
'Ky. CODE Crv. PRAc. ANN. see. 427 (Carroll 1948).
8245 S.W. 2d 430, 432 (Ky. 1952).
7Pettis v. Pettis, 91 Conn. 608, 101 AtI. 13 (1917); Stuart, State ex rel. v.
Ellis, 50 La. Ann. 559, 23 So. 445 (1898); People ex rel. Commissioners v.
Cullen, 153 N. Y. 629, 47 N.E. 894 (1897).
"245 S.W. 2d 430, 433 (Ky. 1952); that the state is an interested party see
discussions 27 C.J.S. 528 (1941); 17 Am!. Jum. 155 (1938); MADDEN, Doztasnc
RELATIONs 263 (1931).
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erty at the time of acquisition by the husband and is a "vested interest"
which can be released or extinguished by her by a lawful agreement
has long been settled.9 Although such agreements are carefully scruti-
nized by the courts as to fairness and freedom from coercion, if they
meet these requirements they become subject to the general law ap-
plicable to contracts. 10
Thus, the question becomes: Can an agreement to accept a valuable
and fair consideration in return for which one waives his distributive
right in another's estate be rescinded by the mutual assent of the
parties after it has been completely performed by one party?
Unless the consideration given for the waiver of the interest is
returned or some other consideration is given by the party seeking to
establish a mutual rescission, such a rescission would be unenforce-
able. It is a well established doctrine that where rescission of a con-
tract is sought, the plaintiff must restore the defendant to the position
he occupied before the contract was made."
It is also well established that a unilateral contract, or a bilateral
contract which has become unilateral by complete performance on
one side, cannot be discharged by a rescission that consists merely of
mutual expressions of assent to rescind.12 This is based on the reason
that only one of the parties has any right under the contract and the
other has only a burden thereunder. Thus one of the parties has every-
thing to gain and nothing to lose, while the other has everything to
lose and nothing to gain.13 One of the parties has given no considera-
tion and the attempted rescission by mutual assent is unenforceable.
Therefore it is urged that, unless the widow in the Cecil case returned
the $2,000 she received under the property settlement or gave some
other good and valuable consideration to support the attempted mutual
rescission, such rescission would be unenforceable and she would have
no claim whatsoever against the deceased's estate.
ROBERT C. MoF~rr
9Wigginton v. Leech's Adm'x., 285 Ky. 787, 149 S.W. 2d 531 (1941); Rogers
v. Isaacs, 6 Ky. Opn. 518 (1872); Winter-Smith v. Goodwin, 4 Ky. Opn. 67
(1870).
"0Rosh v. Bogart, 226 Ala. 284, 146 So. 814 (1938); Appeal of Carter, 59
Conn. 576, 22 Adt. 320 (1890); Johnson's Adm'r v. Johnson, 231 Ky. 740, 22 S.W.
2d 124 (1929); Loud v. Loud, 67 Ky. 453 (1868); Pippin v. Sams, 174 S. C.
444, 177 S.E. 659 (1934).
' C. C. Leonard Lumber Co. v. Reed, 314 Ky. 703, 236 S.W. 2d 961 (1951);
Davis v. Motor Car Finance Co., 274 Ky. 547, 119 S.W. 2d 881 (1938); Black
Motor Co. v. Green, 258 Ky. 72, 79 S.W. 2d 409 (1935); Johnson v. Baker, 246
Ky. 604, 55 S.W. 2d 404 (1933).
'CoRnN, CONTRACTS 990 (1952); WILLISTON, CONTRaACTS 882 (Stud. ed.
1938); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS sec. 406 comment (c) (1933); 17 C.J.S. 921
(1939); 12 A-m. Jun. 1031 (1938).
' CoRmN, CONTRACTS 990 (1952).
